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ABSTRACT 
South Africa‟s economic landscape still reflects the centuries of colonial domination 
and apartheid which resulted in skewered patterns of wealth distribution. South 
Africa enjoys the unenviable reputation of the being one of the most unequal 
societies in the world. It is against this background that the Companies Act of 2008 
was enacted with hopes not only to modernise the South African corporate 
regulatory environment but to steer the corporate world towards assisting in the 
achievement of a socio-economic transformation in South Africa.  
Companies have long been viewed as essentially private organisation existing 
exclusively for the benefit of its members. This view is being increasingly questioned 
especially in an environment of extreme wealth disparity such as South Africa. An 
exclusive shareholder focus appears illegitimate in such an environment.  
This dissertation seeks to assess the impact the new Companies Act will have on the 
socio-economic transformation of the South Afric n society and point areas were 
corporate law can do more to help bring about this transformation.   
It focus on creditors and employees as key corporate constituencies whose interests 
the board of directors have to constantly consider in making decisions. It argues that 
an expansive approach to corporate governance that includes other corporate 
constituencies not only the shareholders is the best way to harness the impressive 
wealth generating capacity of the corporate form to bring about socio-economic 
transformation in South Africa.  
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Chapter 1-Introduction  
1.1 General Background 
In the Department of Trade and Industry‟s (DTI) a policy document titled South 
African Company Law for the 21st Century Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform1  
pondered the question „In whose interest should the corporation be run?‟2. This 
question has been the subject matter of a great debate since the famous debate 
between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd 3 in the early 1930s and still proves to be 
an extraordinarily vexing question up to this day.4 
The conventional way to answer that question, for much of the preceding century, 
has been that a company operates solely for the benefit of its shareholders5. This 
position was famously stated by Milton Friedman, a Nobel peace prize winning 
economist as “there is one and only one social responsibility f business–to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays 
within the rules of the game”6 
This approach is now increasingly being viewed as archaic7; the perception of the 
company is gradually changing. The modern company, compared to other forms of 
business structures, has proven itself to be the most successful vehicle of wealth 
creation8  and today companies occupy a position of enormous economic power.9  
                                                          
1
 Released in May 2004 and which was the basis of the reform process that culminated Companies Act 71 of 
2008 
2
 DTI:- “South African Compa y Law for the 21st Century Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform” pp 20 
3
 The debate was in a series of articles published in the Harvard Law Review starting with For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees? – E. Merrick  Dodd Jnr-   Harvard Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 7 (May, 1932 
4
 Lynn Ann Stout:- “Bad and Not So Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy”  75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1189 pp 1190, 
Anant K. Sundaram and Andrew C. Inkpen:-   “The Corporate Objective Revisited” Organization Science, Vol. 15, 
No. 3 (May - Jun., 2004), pp. 350-363   
5
 David Mellon: “Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law” 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1373;   John F Olson:- “South Africa moves to  a global model of corporate governance but with important 
national variations” pp 219 of Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy edited by 
Tshepo Mongalo [ Juta 2010] 
6
 Milton Friedman: – “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits.” The New York Times 
Magazine, September 13, 1970 
7
  R C Williams:-  Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 2
nd
 Ed [Butterworths 1997] pp 168 
8
 Farouk Cassim; Chapter I of Contemporary Corporate Law- Farouk Cassim,  Jacqueline Yeats, Maleka Feminda 
Cassim, Rehana Cassim, Richard Jooste; Joanne Shev  [Juta publications 2011] pp 3 
9
 Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations; only 49 are countries (based on a comparison 
of corporate sales and country GDPs). The Top 200 corporations’ combined sales are bigger than the combined 
economies of all countries minus the biggest 10 [Top 200 Companies: The Rise Of Global Corporate Power - 
Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh Institute for Policy Studies 2000] 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
P a g e  | 10 
 
 Companies are pivotal to the economic well- being of the modern nation.10 
Consequently the role of companies in society is receiving increased attention, with 
their impact on employees, the environment, local communities, as well as their 
shareholders, becoming the focus of debate11 and this debate is particularly intense 
in the South African context where the political reforms that saw the holding of the 
first democratic elections in South African were not followed by equally 
transformative economic changes. 
The unbridled pursuit of maximizing shareholder value to the exclusion of all other 
interests is increasingly being viewed as being illegitimate, a perception currently 
exemplified in a spectacular fashion by the on-going „Occupy Wallstreet‟ protests 
around the world.12  
The demands that the economic activities of companies should be tempered by 
social considerations are steadily growing in the current climate of an economic 
depression that was triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States 
and amplified by the on-going debt crisis in the European Union.  
The pressure to bring about such a transformation in the manner in which companies 
are governed is more pronounced in South Africa than in most other parts of the 
world. The economic landscape of South Africa is still characterised by a dual 
economy comprising on the one hand a well-developed first world economy and on 
the other, an under-developed and informal one.13  This is as a result of South 
Africa‟s legacy of apartheid which engendered one of the most extreme disparities in 
wealth distribution patterns in the world14 , structural unemployment, widespread 
poverty and low levels of education15.  These challenges are by no means peculiar to 
                                                          
10
 DTI:- (Op cit note 2) pp 4 
11
 Irene Marie Esser & Adriette Dekker:- “The Dynamics of Corporate Governance Principles “ Journal of 
International Commercial Law & Technology Vol3 (2008) pp 159; Michele K Havenga :- “Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duties under our Future Company Law Regime” 9 South  Africa Mercantile Law Journal 310, 312, 314 (1997); 
Anant K. Sundaram and Andrew C. Inkpen(Op cit note 4) 351,  John F Olson:- (Op cit note 5) pp 220  
12
 The Occupy Wall Street is an on-going protest movement which started in Zuccotti Park in New York 
wallstreet financial district and has since developed into a global movement which is protesting against the 
domineering influence of big business over government policy and the unequal distribution of wealth. 
13
 DTI:- (Op cit note2) pp 8-9 
14
 Irene Marie Esser & Adriette Dekker (Op cit note 11) pp 161 
15
 Ralph Hamman: -“Universalizing Corporate Social Responsibility? South African Challenges to the 
International Organisation for Standardization’s New Social Responsibility” Standard Business and Society 
Review pp 110  
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South Africa but South Africa‟s history has given them „a particular character and 
severity‟16 
It is this unique context of a dualised economy and a new constitutional framework 
that necessitated the reform of South African company law in order to make it more 
socially responsive and to reflect the Constitution of South Africa and the principles 
of equality and fairness that it embodies.17 The patterns of wealth distribution in 
South Africa demand, at the very least, a re-examination of the corporate objective. 
1.2 The Research Question and Scope 
The research question that this dissertation seeks to address is, to what extent does 
the new company law regulatory framework characterised by the new Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 and the King Reports protect and advance the interests of key non-
shareholder corporate constituencies? 
 For purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be on two non-shareholder 
constituency groups namely corporate creditors and employees as key providers of 
inputs without which companies cannot successfully operate. This view is supported 
by the DTI in its policy document where it describes investors of a company as 
consisting of shareholders, creditors and employees.18 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 is generally regarded as having made significant 
strides in creating a regulatory framework that can support broader economic and 
social aims.19 It was preceded by ambitious language employed by the DTI in its 
policy document20 that South African company law needs to take into account the 
legitimate interests of stakeholders such as its customers and employees. The 
question that follows is, to what extent will this new regulatory environment steer the 
South African culture towards a more stakeholder inclusive approach? 
Corporate governance models are generally divided into two groups, the Anglo-
American, which is shareholder-centric and European models which are generally 
                                                          
16
 ibid 
17
 DTI :- (Op Cit note 2) pp 8-9; 
18
 DTI:- (op cit note 2) pp 37; see also Esser and DuPlessis:- The Stakeholder Debate and Directors Duties” 
(2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 346–363 
19
 John F Olson (Op cit note 5) pp 219  
20
 DTI:-  (Op cit note 2) pp 26 
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more stakeholder centric and there is a general consensus amongst scholars that 
South African corporate law and governance structures adhere to the Anglo-
American model.21  
Attempts to enact more stakeholder friendly company law statutes in traditionally 
shareholder-centric jurisdictions are by no means new, numerous American states in 
the 1980s passed a series of corporate law statutes that came to be known as 
„constituency statutes‟ that permitted directors to take into consideration  the 
interests of stakeholders in their decision making processes in takeover situations 
and the United Kingdom‟s Companies Act of 2006 which similarly permits directors 
to consider the interests of other stakeholders. It will therefore be useful to evaluate 
the probable impact against the background of the experience with comparable 
enactments passed in the other shareholder-centric jurisdictions.  
However, the attempts to expand the scope of directors‟ duties in the UK and the US 
have been criticised for their failure to bring about positive changes in the manner in 
which companies are governed because they merely permit directors to take into 
consideration the interests of other stakeholder but does not allow them to make 
trade-offs between their respective interests and therefore still subordinate the 
interests of the other constituencies to those of the shareholders.   
The unbridled pursuit of shareholder value still appears, by all accounts, to be the 
prevailing norm in the United States and the United Kingdom in spite of the 
enactment of constituency statutes in numerous American states and the Companies 
Act of 2006 in the UK.  The US has been plagued by a series of corporate scandals 
including the collapses of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco at the start of the first decade 
of the millennium and the sub-prime crisis that emerged in 2007. This raises 
questions about the practical efficacy of the „enlightened shareholder approach‟. If 
South Africa is to make a substantial impact on stakeholder interests, then its reform 
efforts would have to go further than a mere replication of the reforms in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
                                                          
21
 Andrew West:- “Theorizing South Africa’s Corporate Governance –Journal of Business Ethics” (2006) 68:433-
448  pp 434; Stefan Andreasson:- “Understanding Corporate Governance Reform in South Africa; Anglo-
American Divergence, the King Reports and Hybridization”- Business Society OnlineFirst, February 18, 2009 as 
doi:10.1177/0007650309332205 pp 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
P a g e  | 13 
 
This dissertation, in its assessment of the extent to which the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 protects and advances the interests of creditors and employees will draw from 
the experience of the comparable jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and the United 
States and will also look at the traditionally stakeholder-centric jurisdiction of 
Germany and the lessons that can be drawn from their experiences. 
The scope of this dissertation will be limited to an assessment of the legal devices 
designed to protect the interests of employees and creditors as the two most 
important stakeholder groups in terms of the contributions to companies other than 
the shareholders and pays particular attention to the reconstitution of directors‟ 
duties as a method of affording greater protection to employees and creditors. This 
assessment will be made by focusing on the main corporate law statutes, judicial 
decisions and codes of best practices in South Africa and the other jurisdictions 
listed in the preceding paragraph.  
1.3 Significance of the Dissertation 
This dissertation assesses the effectiveness of the Companies Act and the corporate 
regulatory environment augmented by the King Reports and with respect to public 
companies the JSE requirements in protecting and advancing the interest of 
corporate creditors and employees as key corporate constituencies.   
As previously mentioned, South Africa‟s economic landscape still reflects the 
centuries of colonial domination and apartheid which resulted in the creation  of a 
dual economy.22 The less developed of the two which is the informal and unskilled 
economy which lags behind the impressive gains made by the first economy and, as 
the DTI observed, the second economy is at a risk of further marginalization if there 
is no decisive government intervention.23 
Companies can play a decisive role in the economic transformation of the lives of the 
majority of South African citizens and a greater stakeholder focus especially on 
employees will go a long way in helping bring about this transformation. Stronger 
creditor protection measures will likely lower the costs of borrowing and encourage 
                                                          
22
 Andrew West:-  ibid  
23
 DTI:- (Op cit note 2) pp 10 
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lending to small to medium enterprises and therefore assist in the upliftment of the 
other, less formalised economy by proving cheap access to debt finance. 
 This dissertation seeks to assess the impact the new Companies Act will have on 
the socio-economic transformation of the South African society and point areas 
where corporate law can do more to help bring about this transformation.  
1.4 Overview of the Chapters 
Chapter One has introduced the subject-matter of the dissertation and outlines the 
conceptual framework for the dissertation. It also outlines the research question and 
the scope for the dissertation. 
Chapter two lays the foundation for the evaluation of the adequacy of the measures 
designed to protect the legitimate interests of non-shareholder corporate 
constituencies  by engaging in a thorough analysis of the theoretical foundations of 
corporate law with the view to evaluate the basis for the exclusive protection of 
shareholders that are afforded by the fiduciary duties of directors to the exclusion of 
other corporate stakeholders and the persuasiveness of the justifications for the 
exclusion. 
It demonstrates the inadequacies of the traditional justifications for shareholder 
primacy by illustrating that a company requires inputs form different constituencies 
and that there is no empirically valid basis for the exclusion of the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies in the decision making processes of the board of 
directors. Furthermore Chapter Two also lays the theoretical basis for the postulation 
of a more expansive conception of the company that pays due regard to the 
legitimate interests of key corporate constituencies such as creditors and employees. 
Chapter Three analyses the contributions to the capital base of the modern company 
that are made by creditors and postulates that creditors constitute a key and 
indispensable corporate constituency. The chapter gives an outline of the unique 
risks that creditors are exposed to especially by the potential abuse of limited liability. 
It then proceeds to evaluate the adequacy of the measures in the Companies Act to 
protect creditors.  In this evaluation, the chapter engages in a comparative analysis 
of similar provisions in the United Kingdom and United States and the court 
decisions in these jurisdictions. 
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Chapter Four similarly analyses the indispensable contribution made by employees 
of a company to the asset base of that company. It outlines the emergence of a „new 
economy‟ based on the growing value of knowledge as an input and output making it 
the most valuable resource of modern commerce. It illustrates how the emergence of 
the new economy has transformed the perception of employees from being viewed 
as an expense for accounting purposes to being seen as the providers of human 
capital without which companies cannot successfully operate.  
 The chapter also assess the impact of new measures introduced by the Companies 
Act, such as extending the right to bring a derivative action to employees and also 
the power to apply for the initiation of business rescue proceedings, on employees 
as a key corporate constituency.  It argues that company law provide greater 
protection for employees through directors‟ duties and enfranchising employees to 
vote for a portion of the board of directors. 
Chapter Five concludes the dissertation and recommends an expansive 
interpretation of the duties of directors to permit directors to take into consideration 
employees and creditors of their companies in their decision making processes. 
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Chapter 2- The Theoretical Debate  
2.1 Introduction 
Shareholders have traditionally enjoyed exclusive governance protection at the most 
fundamental level, the fiduciary duties of the directors. Directors have a fiduciary 
duty to act in a manner that is in the ratable best interests of shareholders.24  
Generally company law has been reluctant to extend the protection afforded by 
directors‟ fiduciary duties to non-shareholder constituencies.25  
 Section 76(3) (b) of the Companies Act 2008 which provides that “a director of a 
company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers a d perform the 
functions of director …in the best interests of the company” appears to have 
maintained that traditional approach.                
The reconstitution of directors fiduciary duties to permit them to validly consider non-
stakeholder interests in the discharge of their fiduciary duties and the 
enfranchisement of core stakeholder groups like employees and creditors have been 
identified as the most critical areas to be reformed if the advancement of stakeholder 
interests is to move away from being merely superficial to something of substantial 
and practical value.26 
A shift away from the exclusively shareholder orientated conception of what 
constitutes the best interests of the company is a necessary prerequisite for any 
meaningful advancement and protection of stakeholders.  The extent to which the 
interest of non-shareholder constituencies will be advanced under the Companies  
Act 2008 will largely depend on the meaning the courts will attach to the words „the 
company‟ as they are used in s76 (3) (1).   
                                                          
24
Michael P Spisto:- “Legal Aspects of Corporate Governance in the Republic of South Africa: Towards a Possible 
Model for Improved Stakeholder Relations within the Corporation” [ PhD Thesis- University of the 
Witwatersrand April 2006] pp 87:-  “The Shareholder Primacy Norm” 23 J Corp L 277 1997-1998 pp 277 
25
Michael P Spisto :-  ibid 
26
 Allen L White:- “The Stakeholder Fiduciary : CSR, Governance and the Future of Boards”[2006]  – Business  
for Social Responsibility www.bsr.org ; Irene Marie Esser& J. J Du Plessis:-  “op cit note 18; Michael P Spisto 
(Op cit note 23) pp 86-87 
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The courts have been granted an opportunity to re-examine the precise meaning of 
the word „company‟ and clarify the issue.27 The courts should be guided by the 
stated objectives the DTI sought to achieve with the new Companies Act as 
expressed in their policy document preceding the Act. They should be guided by 
section 7 of the Act which inter alia provides that the purposes of the Act are to 
“…promote compliance with the Bill of Rights…reaffirm the concept of the company 
as a means of achieving economic and social benefits…” 28 and also by the King 
Reports. 
In order to gain this much needed fresh perspective on the question of what 
constitutes the company and in whose benefit should it operate requires a thorough 
analysis of the claims of the three main corporate groupings the shareholders, the 
creditors and the employees. The logical starting point is the shareholders who have 
traditionally enjoyed exclusive corporate law protection. 
2.2 Arguments for Continued Adherence to the  Shareholder Primacy Model 
In their policy document, the DTI noted that there are theoretical underpinnings to 
the traditional shareholder-centric approach. The policy document identified three, 
enumerated as follows; 
(i) It is the shareholders who invested their capital in the company  and so 
they should be entitled to its profits after other claimants are satisfied  
(ii) The shareholders are residual claimants of whatever is left over after all 
other claims have been paid, and are consequently best positioned to 
police the efficiency of the company  
(iii) The survival and economic success of a company will deliver social 
benefits to many stakeholder constituencies which will not be delivered if 
the company is a financial failure  
The foregoing captures the prevailing standard arguments for shareholder primacy. 
The first one is based on the property theory which posits that since shareholders 
are the investors in the capital of the company they consequently own it and are 
                                                          
27
 Irene Marie Esser& J. J Du Plessis (Op cit note 26) 
28
 Section 7 (a) (d) 
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therefore exclusively entitled to its proceeds. The second is based on a mixture of 
the residual claimant theory and the nexus of contracts theory.  
Shareholders unlike the other main corporate constituents, the creditors and 
employees, do not contract for fixed returns but to uncertain returns in the form of 
dividends or in the increased value of the shares themselves and a return of capital 
on winding up after all other claims have been paid and consequently bear the 
ultimate risk of the failure of the company.29 The last one is based on the „trickle 
down‟ effect that an efficient market driven by the shareholder value maximization 
mandate is ultimately more beneficial to societies. 
However, the policy document merely states some of the standard arguments and 
treats them as virtually beyond reproach and fails to conduct a thorough evaluation 
of the veracity of these standard arguments and establish if they still warrant further, 
virtually unquestioned, adherence.   
It is consequently imperative to conduct a critical analysis of the main arguments of 
shareholder primacy.  
2.2.1  The Ownership argument  
Whenever the inquiry „who owns the company?‟ is made it is invariably answered 
„the shareholders‟.30 The structures of company law are designed to benefit 
shareholders above any other corporate constituency. Shareholders have been 
characterised as the owners of the company because they can control the affairs of 
the company through the election and removal of directors, ratifying the ultra vires 
acts of the directors and approving fundamental transactions and can therefore 
ensure that the company is run in their interests.31  
 The notion that a company is owned by shareholders is the basis of the agency 
theory that equates the relationship between shareholder and directors with the 
principal and agent relationship, the shareholders being the principals and the 
                                                          
29
 Kathleen Emmarencia Van der Linde:- “Aspects of Regulation of Share Capital and Distribution to 
Shareholders” [PhD thesis University of South Africa] pp 9 
30
 LE Talbot:- Critical Company Law  [Routledge- Cavendish 2008] pp10 
31
 Kathleen Emmarencia Van der Linde (Op cit note 27) 
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directors being agents who have a duty to act in the best interests of the 
shareholders as a body.32 
2.2.2 Deficiencies of the ownership argument  
The assertion that shareholders own the company is the least credible of the 
arguments supporting shareholder primacy. It is easily refutable, firstly on the 
grounds of the misconception that shareholders are the sole investors in a company 
yet they are in reality only providers of equity capital and a company requires more 
than equity capital to function. Creditors and employees provide inputs by way of the 
provisions of debt financing, labour and knowledge.   
Secondly the courts have been consistently clear that a company is not capable of 
being owned. The seminal decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd33 established 
the concept of separate corporate personality34 as the cornerstone of corporate law 
and accordingly once a company has complied with registration formalities and has 
been duly issued with a registration certificate it becomes a fully-fledged separate 
judicial entity35.  
The case of Macaura v Northern Insurance Co Ltd36  is even more instructive 
because it brought the question of „who owns the company?‟ to the fore. In this case 
the sole director and shareholder of a limited company was unable to claim for fire 
damage to the company‟s property on his own personal insurance.  The court held 
that a claim could only be made on the company‟s own insurance as a shareholder 
had no „insurable interest‟ in the company‟s assets. This decision clearly established 
that shareholders do not have a direct interest in the assets of a company and the 
ramifications of this decision are that companies where characterized by the court as 
being incapable of being owned. 
                                                          
32
 Andrew Keay:- “Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the UK’S Enlightened 
Shareholder Value Approach” 29 Sydney L Rev 578 2007 pp583; Margaret M Blair:- “Director’s Duties in a Post 
Enron World; Why Language Matters” Wake Forest Law Review Vol 38, Fall 2003 pp 886 
33
 [1897] AC 22 
34
 LE Talbot:- Op cit note 28 
35
 Section 19 (1) of the Companies Act 2008 
36
 [1925] AC 619 
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The courts have upheld the company‟s separate personality even in the wake of 
immense social pressures37 to do otherwise as is illustrated by the American case of 
People‟s Pleasure Park Co v Rohleder 38 and the South African case of Dadoo Ltd v 
Krugersdorp Municipal Council.39 
The former case involved a company whose total issued shares were owned by a 
former slave, who bought a piece of land that was subject to a restrictive covenant 
that restricted transfer to black people. The question before the court was whether 
the company itself could be said to have a colour and thus be restricted from owning 
the property. The court held that a corporation was incapable of having a colour and 
that it was a distinct legal being separate from its owners and incorporators.  
Accordingly it was the company that owned the property and not Johnson its sole 
shareholder. 
The latter case involved a company whose members were both Indian and the 
company had bought land in an area designated for white people only. The court 
similarly refused to ascribe the racial designation of the company‟s members to the 
company and accordingly held that the property was owned by the company and not 
its members.  
Both decisions where reached when both countries where at their respective heights 
of institutionalised racial prejudice where the court in both countries could have 
found some legal device to uphold the prevailing notions of racial prejudice and claim 
that this was an abuse of the corporate form but the judicial inclination to uphold the 
concept of separate personality overrode all other considerations. 
There is a plethora of cases that unequivocally indicate that, strictly legally speaking, 
shareholders do not own the company but own their shares. A very apt description is 
contained in the case of Short v Treasury Securities40 where the court declared that; 
“Shareholders are not, in the eyes of the law, part owners of the undertaking. In 
other words, a share in the share capital of the company does not imply ownership of 
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a part of the assets or property of the company as the company’s assets belong to 
the company and not its members.”41 
A share gives the shareholder a bundle or conglomerate of rights42 some statutory 
some depending on the terms of issue and the memorandum of incorporation (MOI). 
Significantly, shareholders do not have the right to exercise control over the 
company‟s assets or help themselves to its earnings.43 
 The only time shareholders can receive a portion of the earnings is when the board 
declares a dividend and it is the norm that large listed companies take the lion‟s 
share of profits as retained earnings for future projects.44  
Shareholders do not have a right to have dividends declared but have an expectation 
for declared dividends when the company is performing well enough to do so. 
Shareholders therefore do not have direct control or a direct claim to the company‟s 
underlying assets.45 The power to manage the affairs of a company is vested with 
the board of directors.46 
So even if shareholders can be characterised as owners of the company because 
they appoint and remove directors and approve fundamental transactions47 and any 
other matters that are reserved for shareholder approval in the constitutive 
documents of the company or statu e, the influence they have on the manner in 
which a company is run is, at best,  indirect. 
The language of ownership in describing the relationship between shareholders and 
the directors of a closely held private company, were often the shareholders are the 
directors or can exert a great of influence over the directors is perhaps excusable. To 
describe such a company as being „owned‟ by its shareholders is more reflective of 
the reality of the manner in which small closely held companies are run than the 
strict legal position.  
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However, to describe a widely-held public company as being owned by its 
shareholders is misleading both factually and legally. The influence shareholders 
may have on the board of directors of a public company maybe so minuscule as to 
be negligible.48 Scattered shareholders are an unwieldy body that cannot easily 
organise itself into concerted action and this is compounded by general shareholder 
apathy in attending and voting at meetings.  
The traditional rights attaching to shares, notably the rights to vote at general 
meetings and receive declared dividends are not fixed and can be varied in an 
infinite number of ways which in most cases erode the ability of shareholders to 
control the company in any meaningful way.  
Since shareholders do not negotiate with the management of large listed companies 
regarding the terms of issue or the contents of the MOI and their only option is not to 
buy the shares49  they may sometimes hold shares that carry very little voting power, 
as is the case with respect to preference shares which typically carry a right to 
receive a modest fixed percentage dividend and very limited rights to voting in most 
cases restricted to voting in certain matters only.50 This reduces the practical efficacy 
of any oversight function shareholders exercise over the manner in which the 
company is being run. The Act even now permits in certain circumstances, the 
issuance of shares that carry no voting rights at all.51 
This already weakened position of shareholders of public companies is reinforced by 
the now widespread use of uncertificated or intermediated shares which are in 
electronic format and held by a series of intermediaries for the ultimate benefit of 
their owners. In a multi-tiered system such as the one in use in South Africa52 where 
the top-most tier does not have details of   the beneficial owner of the securities they 
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hold, which will be held by an intermediary on a lower tier of the system, the concept 
of full legal ownership of shares is not readily applicable.53 
 Consequently it is highly misleading to describe the relationship between directors 
and shareholders in a large listed company as one of principal and agent. The 
relationship barely resembles the principal-agent relationship.   Under the law of 
agency an agent has a duty of obedience owed to the principal and can only operate 
within the confines of the principal‟s mandate which is usually defined with a degree 
of particularity. A principal has control over and has the power to direct the actions of 
an agent.  
The board of directors sits at the very apex of the decision-making process in a 
company and are not subject to the control or direction of anyone. A director acting 
in that capacity has a positive duty to act independently.54  
Shareholders are vested with the power to elect and remove directors but they 
cannot tell them what to do. The nature of the mandate of directors is by nature open 
ended and they have a great deal of discretion in the manner in which they execute 
their duties which agents do not have. 
  Directors of a widely held company occupy such an exalted position and wield so 
much power that Professor Bainbridge describes this status quo as „director 
primacy‟.55 It is submitted that this is a far more accurate description of the reality of 
the position of the board of directors compared to the analogy of agency.  The board 
of directors is best understood as a sui generis organ of modern corporate 
structure.56  
2.2.3 The Nexus of contracts Theory  
The nexus of contracts theory proffers more credible arguments why shareholders 
are the exclusive beneficiaries of directors‟ duties. The nexus of contracts theory 
rejects as irrelevant the notion that a company can be owned and views the 
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company as an institution existing primarily to facilitate contracting between various 
parties that have claims against the company.57 
The main claimants of the company, the shareholders, employees and creditors all 
deal with the company on the basis of contract. Employees contract for fixed salaries 
and creditors for a fixed rate of interest and shareholders contract for the residual 
benefits of the activities of the company after all the other claimants have been 
satisfied and have thus been described as residual claimants or residual 
beneficiaries.  
The main thrust of the nexus of contracts theory is that shareholders deserve 
exclusive governance protection afforded by directors‟ fiduciary duties because they 
face the most complicated contracting problems amongst the main groups of 
claimants which make them the most vulnerable corporate constituency.58  
Whereas employees and creditors can negotiate for contractual terms with a 
relatively greater degree of particularity the contractual relationship between the 
company and shareholders is by its very nature more open ended and due to its 
inherently uncertain nature cannot be framed in very particular terms59. It can 
therefore be said that shareholders are at the mercy of the board of directors60 and 
accordingly should enjoy the protection afforded by directors‟ fiduciary duties. 
It is argued that other claimants such as employees and creditors are either in a 
better bargaining position61 or they are adequately protected in other legislation or 
through specific gap-filling measures contained in the primary company law statute. 
Shareholders do not generally enjoy any protection outside the primary company law 
statute. Fiduciary duties are accordingly seen as a special gap-filling measure to fill 
in the void created by the indeterminate nature of the contractual relationship 
between the company and its shareholders.62 
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The DTI appears to subscribe to this line of reasoning. The DTI  argued in its policy 
document that employees are protected under labour law and large creditors protect 
themselves through contracts and that shareholders are generally exposed to the 
greatest risk.63 
True as it maybe that shareholders face extraordinarily complex contracting 
problems and deserve protection against potential self-dealing tendencies on the 
part of the board of directors; the nexus of contracts theory does not explain why 
shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of directors‟ fiduciary duties to the 
exclusion of other corporate constituencies.  
2.2.4. Deficiencies of the Nexus of contracts theory   
The nexus of contracts theory has a lot to commend it but its fundamental weakness 
is that it is anchored on the notion of freedom of contract between parties of equal 
bargaining power.  The terms of the contracts entered into between a company and 
stakeholders are for the most part, not a product of free contracting but are simply 
dictated by corporate managers or by statute64. 
Shareholders who purchase the shares of a well-established and listed public 
company do not negotiate the terms of issue or the rights attaching to the shares and 
have only the option to buy or decline to purchase the shares. Similarly lower level 
employees do not make any meaningful input in determining the terms of 
employment and invariably just append their signatures on standard form contracts. 
Employee cardinal interests are typically job security and increased remuneration 
and such interests cannot be provided for in a contract with any degree of 
particularity. The types of harm that might affect employees as a constituency such 
as lay-offs, plant closures or stagnant salaries are difficult to foresee and adequately 
provide for in a contract. If it was at all possible to adequately provide for such issues 
in a contract then typical employee contracts would be voluminous and would 
invariably lead to complicated legal issues regarding enforcement.65  
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 Further, the negotiating positions between employees and the company are 
inherently unequal because of; inter alia, information asymmetries in favour of 
management and unequal bargaining power in favour of the employer.66  
Creditors, in some cases, may have a better bargaining position but some of their 
primary concerns such as maintaining default risk within acceptable limits are difficult 
to adequately provide for in a contract and require proactive monitoring on the part of 
the creditors which has cost implications. 
 According to the OECD this problem is especially pronounced in developing 
countries which are characterized by weak judicial systems which render the 
enforcement of contracts ineffective which in turn renders the distinction between 
„residual‟ and „non-residual‟ claimants of doubtful applicability in practice.67 
The reality is that all three constituencies face contracting problems and contracts 
cannot fully protect any of the parties and they accordingly require protection from 
other sources such as statutory provisions and directors‟ fiduciary duties.  
2.2.5 The Residual Claimants and Ultimate Bearers of Risk Argument 
Shareholders are characterized as residual beneficiaries of corporate activities and 
consequently they bear the greatest risk of the failure of the company.68 The 
quintessence of the argument is that since shareholder contract for the unspecified 
surplus from the activities of a company after all other claims have been met they 
accordingly have the greatest interest in the outcome of a company‟s  activities 
unlike fixed claimants whose only interest is that their fixed claims be met.69  
Accordingly they have the greatest incentive to police the manner in which the 
company is being run and value fiduciary duties more than any other corporate 
constituency.70 
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However, this argument again fails to explain why shareholders should be the 
exclusive beneficiary of the fiduciary duties of directors to the exclusion of all other 
corporate constituencies. 
2.2.6  Deficiencies of the Residual Claimants and Ultimate Bearers of Risk 
Argument 
The only time shareholders have an unfettered claim to the residual assets of the 
company after all claims have paid is upon dissolution of the company and not while 
it is a going concern.71 The board of directors has virtually unfettered power over 
what appears on the balance sheet as profits and the extent of dividend that is 
declared which is routinely modest with the company retaining the lion‟s shares of 
profits to finance future projects.72  
Shareholders do not necessarily bear the greatest risk of the failure of the company. 
This notion is based on a very myopic conception of company which views the 
company as being comprised solely of capital assets, which is what shareholders 
contribute to the company, and restricts the meaning of risk to financial risk.73 
Companies comprise of a lot more than financial assets and the term capital should 
have a broader meaning than just financial assets. There is very little doubt that 
employees are considered to be a key asset74 and the term „human capital‟ is 
becoming common place. This is truer in the 21st century than before as there is a 
general shift from industrial based to knowledge based economies whose central 
economic activity is the provision of knowledge services.75 
Yet because a company is generally conceived as comprising of only financial 
assets the meaning of risk is also accordingly restricted to financial risk. 76 The risks 
that other corporate constituencies are exposed to when a company is under-
performing or fails such as increased default risk, plant closures, lay-offs and the 
prospects of lengthy periods of unemployment or getting an inferior job with 
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considerably lower remuneration levels are not accorded due weight in the decision 
–making process of the board of directors and are subordinated to financial risk.  
 At, times, especially in the scenario of a plant closure, the board of directors‟ 
adherence to the profit maximization mandate may simply mean transferring the 
prospects of materialization of financial risk to other constituencies such as 
employees and the community. A company in financial trouble may embark on high 
risk projects that exponentially increase default risk.77  Simply put, directors may 
avoid losses for shareholders by simply transferring risk of harm to the other 
corporate constituencies. 
The modern and prevalent practice of diversifying shareholdings significantly 
reduces the financial risk faced by shareholders.  A policy of diversifying the portfolio 
of shares, that is, holding shares from a diverse number of companies means that 
the overall risk as the variations in returns will be reduced as the different fortunes of 
the companies will offset one another.78 This illustrates that share ownership in 
actual fact may not be a particular risky investment.79 
2.3 Team Production Theory  
The team production theory, developed by professors Margaret M Blair & Lynn A 
Stout provides, it is submitted, a more accurate description of the modern company 
and can serve as an alternative and more credible normative foundation for company 
law. It is a descriptive and instrumental theory of the company which is anchored on 
the premise that the critical factors of production and the continuing inputs necessary 
for a company to operate successfully are contributed jointly and inseparably by 
different groups chiefly the shareholders who provide initial capital, skilled labour 
which provides human capital and creditors who provide debt capital.80  The DTI in 
its policy document acknowledges this inescapable fact and describes the investors 
of a company as its shareholders, employees and creditors.81 
Companies are constantly competing not only for market share but also for acquiring 
and retaining the best employees, the most favourable supply terms and obtaining 
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debt and loan finance on the most favourable terms.82 Success on all these fronts 
requires management of stakeholder relations in order to acquire a competitive edge 
and to lower the cost of obtaining capital. 
  Since all the inputs necessary in successful corporate activities come inseparably 
and indivisibly from different corporate constituencies it is difficult to attribute any 
proportion of the corporate output to any particular group‟s contribution.83 
Consequently and fundamentally no single corporate constituency, the shareholders, 
managers, creditors or employees has any natural entitlement to the exclusive 
benefits of the proceeds of corporate activity. 84  
The team production theory recognises the reality that the board of a public company 
occupies a very powerful position. The notion that the ultimate responsibility for 
governing a public company lies with its board of directors is a defining attribute of 
the modern day public company.85   
   This separation gives management a great deal of latitude in the manner in which 
they pursue the activities of the company and securing its objectives. 86 Section 
66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 acknowledges and entrenches the exalted 
position of the board by providing that the business and affairs of a company must 
be managed by or under the direction of its board. 
The team production theory describes the board of directors as a „mediating 
hierarchy‟. 87 Instead of being beholden to any particular group, the team production 
theory postulates that the primary purpose of the board of directors is to protect the 
contributions of its corporate constituencies for the interest of the enterprise as a 
whole.88 It is an inclusive approach aimed at balancing the interests of the 
constituencies that constitute the company and recognises that an interest that may 
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be primary at one point in a company‟s existence   maybe secondary at a later 
stage.89 
To make a more compelling case for the team production approach it is imperative to 
examine the contributions made by the other main corporate constituencies, that is 
the creditors and employees and this shall be the object of the succeeding chapters. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The standard arguments for continued adherence to the shareholder primacy norm 
do not adequately explain why shareholders should enjoy exclusive governance 
protection to the exclusion of all other corporate stakeholders and accordingly there 
are no valid reasons for taking a constrained view of what constitutes the company 
and its best interests under section 76 (3) (b).  
The team production theory provides, it is submitted, a more accurate description of 
the reality that obtains in the modern public company. The inescapable reality is that 
the continuing inputs a company requires in order to operate successfully are 
contributed by a number of constituencies and not just shareholders and 
consequently the question of who should benefit from the fiduciary duties of the 
directors should depend on the nature, size and importance of contributions they 
make to the company and the risk they face as a result of their contribution and 
association with the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89
 Irene Marie Esser: - The Protection of Stakeholder Interests in Terms of South African King III Report on 
Corporate Governance: An Improvement on King II? (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 188-201 pp 199 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
P a g e  | 31 
 
Chapter 3 
Creditors as a Corporate Constituency  
3.1 Introduction 
Creditors are key providers of finance to companies and this chapter seeks to 
examine the importance of the inputs made by creditors to the capital base that a 
company requires to profitably conduct its activities and the unique challenges and 
risks that creditors as a corporate constituency are exposed to. It seeks to 
interrogate and critically examine the adequacy of South Africa‟s creditor protection 
measures in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and explores the question 
whether directors‟ duties should be extended to operate for the benefit of corporate 
creditors. 
3.2  Creditors contribution to corporate resources 
The financial resources that a company requires to fund its activities are sourced 
mainly from either internal sources that is either equity capital and or retained 
earnings or by external sources that is debt.  Debt financing constitutes an integral 
and indispensable part of the financial structure of most companies.90  
Though equity capital has been described as the „primary source‟ of capital it does 
not necessarily play a very significant role in the provision of the working capital for 
companies.91 There is no pr scribed minimum for what constitutes sufficient levels of 
share capital that a company needs to raise or maintain in order to be registered or 
to continue its business operations either under the old Companies Act 61 of 1973 or 
the new Companies Act 71 of 2008.  A company can in-fact commence business 
operations with no paid up capital at all.92 
Depending on the financial standing of the company, policy on the issuance of new 
shares, and the nature of the credit market, a company can rely much more on debt 
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financing to finance projects than on equity finance and in many respects reliance on 
equity finance is declining in favour of debt finance.93 
The significance of equity finance as a financing tool for corporate activities is further 
diminished when one considers that the funds that shareholders contribute to a 
company as equity capital reaches the coffers of a company in the limited 
circumstance where there is a primary issue of shares.94  
Owing to the complex legal rules designed to protect the investing public such as 
those contained in chapter 4 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 that require inter alia 
the issuance of a prospectus and the attendant risk of legal liability, the cost of 
issuing a primary offer of shares, compared to issuing debt instruments or borrowing 
funds from a financial institution, can be very significant.  Consequently most shares 
are traded on the secondary market as opposed to primary markets.95 Primary offers 
after the IPO are not common place. 
This means that the funds earned from most of the share trading activities on the 
world stock markets do not reach the coffers of the companies that have issued the 
shares, but to the holders of the shares who are disposing of them in secondary 
markets. This fact diminishes the significance of equity capital as a source of working 
capital.  
Companies frequently retire their own equity through share buy-backs which reduces 
the number of shares of that company which are available in the market which 
further diminishes the importance of equity capital and is indicative of a greater 
reliance on other sources of financing like retained earnings and debt financing.   
Equity capital, in the light of the facts and practises described in the preceding 
paragraphs, should be viewed not as an indication that shareholders make a greater 
contribution to the corporate capital base than other corporate constituencies such 
as employees and creditors, but should be understood as a legal device and an 
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allocation system which organises the rights of the shareholders amongst 
themselves and in relation to creditors.96  
3.3 Risks that creditors are exposed to 
Limited liability poses a unique threat to creditors as a corporate constituency 
because it restricts creditors‟ claims to the assets of the company. Separate 
corporate personality and the attendant limited liability are legal devices designed to 
limit the liability of shareholders to the property adventured and Kathleen van der 
Linde has described it as „defensive asset partitioning‟ because the liability of 
shareholders is restricted to their contribution to the share capital of the company.97 
 Since the seminal ruling in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd98  which emphatically 
upheld the separate personality of the company by ruling that creditors could not sue 
the dominant shareholder of that company for the recovery of outstanding debts, the 
law  has upheld the separate personality with deviation only in the most exceptional 
of circumstances.  
However, the separate personality of a company can be used to expropriate wealth 
from creditors to shareholders while shareholders are protected against claims by 
the company‟s creditors by limited liability and this problem is particularly acute in 
„owner-managed‟ companies or companies with dominant shareholders that are 
capable of exerting influence on management.  
 The abuse of corporate personality has been identified by the OECD as the 
pressing governance problem in developing nations such as South Africa as 
opposed to the „principal-agent’ problem that lies at the centre of corporate 
governance studies in the United States and the United Kingdom99  
South Africa has a well-documented history of arrangements that magnify the 
powers of certain groups of shareholders.100 At independence in 1994 South Africa 
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had (and still has) family dominated companies that made use of pyramid structures 
of control, and a vast network of cross-shareholdings and directorships.101 
 These corporate control arrangements distort the relationship between cash flow 
and voting rights and allow dominant shareholders to control a vast amount of 
corporate assets more than their actual equity ownership would justify thereby 
inviting abuses of corporate governance and weakening the oversight of the capital 
markets.102  
However, the potentially adverse effects of these control structures has been 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that these control structures have largely, undergone 
transformative changes in the period after independence.  The six main 
conglomerate groupings that dominated the JSE at independence unbundled many 
of their diversified interests.103 The dominance of mining finance houses has been 
dismantled, however, other control structures like family-controlled companies and 
BEE shareholding structures that have largely followed the path of the 
conglomerates in order to gain control of companies with modest capital 
commitments still remains. 
The DTI in its policy document stated that one of the key functions of company law is 
to provide protection for investors and that investors in a company are broadly 
constituted by equity investors, employees and creditors.104 
It is imperative therefore to assess the changes ushered in by the Companies Act 
through the prism of the peculiar governance problems relating to abuse of minority 
shareholders and creditors that occur in developing economies such as South Africa, 
which is characterised by a high degree of concentration of wealth, and determine 
whether the interest of corporate creditors as a critical corporate constituency group 
have been adequately protected. To this end it is imperative to briefly look at the 
risks creditors are exposed to.  
3.3.1 Abusive Transactions and the Expropriation Problem 
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Research over the years indicate that the corporate governance landscape of 
developing countries is plagued with an expropriation problem which is characterised 
by the transfer of assets and profits out of companies for the benefit of those who 
control them105 in a manner that prejudices minority shareholders and creditors of 
their fair share of the income from corporate resources.  
The expropriation problem manifests itself in many forms; it can assume the form of 
wealth transfer by the dominant shareholders through loans and loan guarantees, 
excessive compensation or self-serving transactions such as „asset-stripping 
takeovers” or asset sales advantageous to the controlling shareholder or inordinately 
large dividend distribution that may constitute a partial liquidation.106  
This problem is particularly pronounced within related companies which are 
ultimately controlled by a dominant shareholder where corporate wealth can be 
expropriated by insiders through setting unfair terms for intra-group transactions 
involving the sale of goods and services and transfers of assets and control 
blocks.107 
3.3.2 Bargaining Power, Precontractual Information Asymmetries and 
Incomplete Contracts 
It has long been contended that creditors are in a position to sufficiently protect 
themselves through contract and accordingly do not require the protection afforded 
by fiduciary duties and cons quently have no locus standi to sue on the grounds 
sounding in mismanagement or even-self dealing.108  
However, to argue that creditors can be wholly protected from all possible business 
risks that they may be exposed to in their dealings with corporate debtors solely 
through contractual provisions, presupposes equal bargaining power between 
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creditors and corporate managers and a world of perfect markets where the 
contracting parties have full and perfect information and financial contracting is 
completely without costs. 109  
Creditors are not a homogenous group which make it impossible to make 
generalisations about their differing needs and levels of protection.110Credit markets 
are far from perfect and frequently a company occupies a position of greater market 
bargaining power and access to information than a creditor who will frequently be 
unaware of and cannot acquire critical information about the corporate borrower 
without incurring costs. Further, the contractual perspective fails to take into account 
involuntary creditors who do not contract at all with the company such as the victims 
of a delictual wrong committed by a company.   
Contracts cannot provide for every possible contingency that might occur so much 
that even if the problem of pre-contractual information asymmetry can be addressed 
by legal rules aimed at mandatory disclosures, creditors are still at risk of post-
contractual opportunism.  
Where one party, for instance a company is better informed about the circumstances 
pertaining to the performance of its contractual obligations and the other party is not 
in a position to adequately monitor the other party‟s behaviour for possible deviation 
from agreed upon terms without incurring costs, then such a party is at a risk of 
incurring losses due to post contractual opportunism.  
 So creditors might assess the risk of loaning money to or buying the debt 
instruments of a particular company on the basis of the information that is available 
to it at the time and concerning specified projects. Corporate managers can, 
however, increase default risk by embarking on other riskier projects with potential of 
higher returns.  The likelihood of such behaviour is greater in owner managed 
companies where the owner managers can put  assets belonging to creditors in high 
risk ventures and if successful they get the profits and if not, the creditors face 
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default by the company and the shareholders, including the owner managers are 
protected by limited liability. 111 
This problem can be ameliorated by the use of restrictive „loan covenants’ which 
restrict the borrower‟s investment and financing policies or insisting upon directors‟ 
personal suretyships over the debts of the company. However, the efficacy of loan 
covenants is dependent upon the ability of the creditor to monitor the behaviour of 
the borrower and, in the first place, the bargaining power of the creditor to impose 
such restrictive covenant or to insist that directors personally guarantee the loan.  
Further, insisting that directors guarantee the debts of the company they run is 
completely impractical when dealing with a large listed company where the directors 
often do not have a personal stake in the company and will serve to discourage 
borrowing.  
  Creditors that wield a great deal of bargaining power such as banks can insist upon 
such covenants and can afford to absorb the costs that come with monitoring the 
activities of a borrower but other classes of creditors such as trade suppliers for 
instance who may rely on that particular company for a large proportion of their 
business do not wield such bargaining power. 
3.3.3 Insolvent Trading  
It is a well-documented phenomenon that when a company is on the verge of 
insolvency, the directors and the shareholders have an incentive to embark on high 
risk business ventures in anticipation of trading out the company‟s financial troubles 
and saving the company from being liquidated.  Because of the protection afforded 
by limited liability they stand to lose nothing by embarking on such a course of 
action.112  
When a company is on the verge of insolvency, the shareholders‟ investment is 
already dissipated and what is put at risk are assets that would otherwise serve to 
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satisfy creditors‟ claims. If the undertakings are successful the shareholders stand to 
gain but if not creditors‟ claims might not be met with the remaining assets.  
3.4 Creditor Protection in the United Kingdom and United States   
In order to acquire a better understanding of the creditor protection measures under 
the South African company law regulatory framework and their effectiveness or lack 
thereof it is necessary to engage in a comparative analysis of similar measures in 
the comparable jurisdictions the UK and US. 
Company law has generally tried to provide for protection of creditor in company law 
by judicial decisions and by the provision of detailed rules rather than general 
standards and directors‟ fiduciary duties.113  Creditor protection is the normative 
basis for rules on the raising of capital and the notions of legal capital, capital 
maintenance and restrictions on some forms of distributions and insolvent trading. 
The detailed rules on corporate creditor protection take numerous forms but are 
directed at ensuring that a company has adequate assets to satisfy the claims of 
creditors in the event of insolvency and in these jurisdictions courts have an 
existence of a fiduciary duty operating in favour of creditors when a company enters 
the brink of insolvency. 
3.5  United Kingdom  
3.5.1 Legal Capital  
Share capital has been described as a „protective cushion‟ for creditors‟ claims and 
corporate law has generally prohibited distributions being made out of a company‟s 
share capital. It follows that one obvious method to protect creditor interests would 
be to ensure that companies acquire certain levels of capital before they can trade. 
English company law, on account of the operation of the Second Company Law 
Directive114 provides for minimum levels of capital for public companies.115  
This provision is clearly designed to counter the potentially adverse consequences to 
creditors of undercapitalization. Since the rules of capital maintenance simply 
directed that share capital could not be returned to shareholders if the amount of the 
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share capital is very low, then obviously the share capital would be woefully 
inadequate to satisfy creditors‟ claims because even if it is adequately maintained, 
on winding up it would still not be able to satisfy all of the creditors‟ claims. 
However, minimum capital requirements are an ineffective measure of protecting 
creditors for the following reasons. Firstly, it is impossible to determine what would 
constitute adequate levels of capitalisation for all companies and any figure arrived 
at will necessarily be arbitrary. Secondly, capital requirements are concerned with 
the value of contributions to the share capital of a company at the commencement of 
trading when the greatest risk of prejudice to creditor interests occurs at 
insolvency.116  
Thirdly, and in any event, English company law provides for a bare minimum117 
which bears no relation to the riskiness of the business that a particular company is 
engaged in but is in fact an arbitrary figure.118 Minimum capital requirements are 
either too little to provide adequate protection of creditor or too high as to depress 
competition by discouraging new entrants. 
3.5.2 Regulation of Repurchases and Redemption of Shares and Reduction of 
Capital 
A common method of transferring wealth from the company to its shareholders is 
through share buy-backs and if not subject to some form of constraints, share buy-
backs can impoverish a company to the prejudice of the company‟s creditors. 
Section 658 of the Companies Act 2006 codifies the English common law restriction 
against a company buying its own shares with some exceptions provided for by 
section 659.  A company can only repurchase its shares otherwise than for valuable 
consideration in a duly made reduction of capital or pursuant to a court order.  
Private companies are allowed to issue redeemable shares and public companies 
are also allowed provided that their articles permit the issue of redeemable 
shares.119 Shares can only be redeemed if they are fully paid up and in the case of 
                                                          
116
 Gower and Davies:- op cit note 113 pp 229 
117
 Section 763(1) of the Companies Act 2006 prescribes a minimum of £50 000 or its Euro equivalent 
118
 Gower and Davies:- op cit 113 pp 225 
119
 Section 684 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
P a g e  | 40 
 
public companies can only be done out of distributable profits of the company or 
from the proceeds of a new issue made for the purposes of the redemption.120  
Companies with a share capital can reduce it in terms of a special resolution 
confirmed by the court and in the case of a private company by special resolution 
accompanied by a solvency statement.121 Creditors are entitled to object to a 
reduction of capital and the court can direct the company to secure the claim of the 
objecting creditor.122 
3.5.3 Regulation of Distributions 
Shareholders are rewarded for their investment through distributions, for instance by 
declaring dividend. However, without some regulation, distributions can impoverish a 
company to the detriment of its creditors. It follows therefore that to adequately 
protect creditors there is need for some form of regulation of distributions. This is the 
rationale behind the traditional English company law prohibition of paying dividends 
out of the share capital of a company. The Companies Act of 2006 in section 830 (1) 
still maintains this principle that distributions can only be made out of distributable 
profits. 
3.5.4 Prohibition against Insolvent Trading 
The English Courts appear to recognise some sort of directors‟ duty running in 
favour of the creditors of a company that is on the brink of insolvency. For instance in 
the English case of Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd; 123 
„…the conscience of the company, as well of its management, is confided in its 
directors. A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors of the 
company to ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered and 
that its property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the directors 
themselves to the prejudice of the creditors”.124  
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This approach has to some extent been codified by section 172 (3) of the 
Companies Act 2006 which provides that in certain circumstances directors should 
consider or act in the interest of the creditors of the company. It is submitted that 
financial difficulties that might result in insolvency are one set of circumstances that 
will require directors to act in the best interests of the creditors of the company.  
The prohibition against insolvent and fraudulent trading contained in section 993 of 
the Companies Act of 2006, which provides that any person who carries on business 
with the intent to defraud the creditors of the company shall be guilty of an offence, 
augments the notion that in certain circumstances directors have a duty to act in the 
interests of the creditors of the company.  
3.6 United States of America 
The formation and regulations of companies in the United States falls within the 
individual jurisdictions of the states in the federation and consequently is governed 
by several different statutes. However, some attempts to harmonize the corporate 
law in America have been made and the Revised Model Business Corporations 
Act125 is an embodiment of such attempts.  
Further, since fifty percent of listed companies and sixty percent of all Fortune 500 
companies are domiciled in the state of Delaware126, the Delaware General 
Corporate Law has a decisive influence on the American corporate law landscape 
and the Delaware Court of Chancellery has over two hundred years of being at the 
forefront of setting corporate law precedents in America.  
3.6.1 Legal Capital  
Neither the Delaware General Corporations Law (DGCL) nor the Model Business 
Corporations Act (Model Act) prescribes a minimum capital level. Both statutes 
provide for an authorised share capital to be set out in the company‟s certificate of 
incorporation. Although it may appear that the capital raising and maintenance rules 
of both the DGCL and the Model Act afford creditors very little protection, the 
solvency and liquidity test provide some genuine protection for creditors.  
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3.6.2 Regulation of Distributions 
Rather than imposing an arbitrary minimum capital level for public companies, the 
Model Act and the DGCL provides for restrictions against distributions that 
impoverish the company to the detriment of the creditors.  
The Model Act provides that a company is prohibited from making a distribution that 
would render the company unable to pay its debts as they become due in the usual 
course of business or that would result in the company‟s total assets being less than 
the sum of its total liabilities.127 The DGCL similarly provides that the board of 
directors can only declare dividends out of the distributable profits of the company.128 
 The American solvency and liquidity test, like minimum capital and capital 
maintenance rules is aimed at preventing directors from favouring shareholders 
through partial liquidations and recognition of the expectation of creditors to be paid 
timeously.129 The solvency and liquidity test, which has a direct relationship to the 
actual financial standing of a company, will prevent any transaction in favour of a 
group of shareholders which will deplete the assets of the company and potentially 
prejudice the company‟s creditors.  
In the event of an unlawful distribution, the directors under whose administration the 
breach occurred shall be jointly and severally liable for a period of six years after 
paying such unlawful dividend or after an unlawful share repurchase or 
redemption.130 The Model Act similarly provides for personal liability to the company 
for a director who votes for an unlawful distribution.131 
3.6.3 Share Repurchases, Redemptions and Reduction of Capital  
Both the DGCL and the Model Act unlike the English Companies Act 2006, grant 
companies the general power to purchase or redeem its own shares except in 
certain specified circumstances. The DGCL allows share repurchases except in 
circumstances where it would impair the company‟s capital132 and directors who 
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make an unlawful share repurchase will incur personal liability in terms of section 
174. The Model Act similarly allows share repurchases provided they meet the equity 
insolvency test or the balance sheet test.133  
3.6.4 Insolvent Trading 
The influential Delaware Court of Chancellery recognised the need for greater 
protection for creditors when a company is experiencing financial difficulties and 
found the existence of a director‟s duty running in favour of creditors. In Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V v Pathe Communications Corp134  Chancellor Allen 
held that; 
“Where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is 
not merely the agent of the [stockholders], but owes its duty to the corporate 
enterprise…in such circumstances management is not disloyal in failing to act in the 
interests of the stockholders …rather, management owes a supervening loyalty to 
the corporate entity. It has an obligation to the community of interest that sustains 
the corporation, to exercise judgement in an informed, good faith effort to maximize 
the corporation’s long term wealth creating capacity.”135 
In the more recent case of Production Resources136 the Delaware Chancellery Court 
adhered to the same line of reasoning and held that in financially distressed firms 
creditors become the residual claimants and consequently directors have a duty to 
maximize, in these circumstances, the value of the company on behalf of its 
creditors. 
3.7 South Africa 
3.7.1 Legal Capital 
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The Companies Act 2008 adopts the American approach and does not provide for a 
minimum share capital and instead affords protection for creditors by the more 
effective solvency and liquidity test. 
3.7.2 Regulation of Distributions  
 The board of directors must not make any proposed distribution without first 
conducting the solvency and liquidity test as it is set out in section 4 of the Act.137 
The Act defines distributions in very broad terms and includes transfers of money or 
other property, the incurrence of obligation and the forgiveness or waiver of an 
obligation for the benefit of one or more holders of the shares of that company, or of 
another company within the same group companies by way of, inter alia, payment of 
dividends, payments in lieu of capitalisation shares, share buybacks and financial 
assistance. 
If the board of directors authorises a dividend distribution in breach of section 46, 
then the directors present and who voted or failed to vote against the resolution 
authorising the distribution will incur personal liability for the losses sustained by the 
company as a result of the distribution in terms of section 46(6) as read with section 
77 (3) (e) (vi). Incurring personal liability will be a strong deterrent against 
transferring wealth from a company that would impoverish or drive it into insolvency. 
3.7.3 Restrictions against Financial Assistance 
Financial assistance falls under the definition of distribution and the Act restricts the 
board of directors from passing a resolution authorising the provision of financial 
assistance by way of a loan, guarantee or the provision of security or otherwise to 
any person for the purpose of, or in connection with the subscription of any options, 
or any securities of the company or related company.138 This provision is designed to 
curb the mischief of „asset stripping’  that may occur in a debt-laden takeover or 
leveraged buyout,  whereby a purchaser with insufficient funds borrows heavily to 
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finance the purchase of a majority holding in the target company and upon acquiring 
the majority holdings, sells off  the target company‟s assets to discharge the loans.139   
The regulation also extends to financial assistance rendered to directors and 
prescribed officers and related and inter-related companies.140 Since directors, 
especially of a large public company occupy a position of great power with respect to 
the affairs and resources of a company, they can perpetrate all sorts of abusive and 
self-serving transactions especially by using the company to provide loans or 
security for their loans and deplete the asset base of the company. 
 3.7.4 Insolvent Trading 
One of the traditional justifications for exclusive shareholder protection by directors‟ 
fiduciary duties is that they are the residual beneficiaries of the proceeds of a 
company‟s activities and consequently bear the greatest risk from the failure of the 
company. However, when a company is on the verge of insolvency the creditors 
have a greater interest in the assets because creditors‟ claims rank higher in 
liquidation proceedings than those of shareholders, they effectively become the 
residual beneficiaries of the company.141  
It follows therefore that if shareholders are supplanted by creditors as the residual 
beneficiaries or risk bearers when a company approaches insolvency then there are 
very compelling grounds for establishing a fiduciary duty to protect creditors in these 
circumstances.  
In the circumstances surrounding insolvency, what would be in the best interests of 
the shareholders as a body is inherently at crossroads with the interests of creditors?  
Equating the best interests of the company to the best interests of the shareholders 
will be contrary to the reality that creditors.  In these circumstances creditors have a 
greater interest in the assets of the company, and will lead to unjustified prejudice to 
the interests of the creditors, who constitute a key corporate constituency. 
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The Companies Act 2008 in section 22 prohibits a company from carrying on 
business recklessly, with gross negligence or for fraudulent purposes and against 
trading under insolvent circumstances.142 
A director who acts in breach of the provisions of section 22 will incur liability for any 
loss, damages, or costs sustained by the company as a result of the breach in terms 
of section 77(3). The prospect of incurring personal liability will, no doubt, deter the 
directors from embarking on a course of action that is unduly prejudicial to creditors. 
Section 22 is augmented by section 218(2) which provides that any person who 
contravenes any provision of the Act is liable to any other person who suffers any 
loss or damage as a result of such breach. Creditors will be entitled to such redress 
from the company or its directors for breaches of section 22 that causes losses for 
them. 
 As a result of these provisions of section 22 read with 218(2) and the wide definition 
accorded to distributions and the requirement to conduct a solvency and liquidity test 
before authorising a distribution, directors in South Africa would have to keep 
themselves closely acquainted with the financial state of the company in order to 
avoid incurring personal liability. It is submitted that the practical effect of these 
provisions is that directors of companies will from time to time have to actively 
consider the interests in their decision making process especially if the company is 
experiencing financing difficulties. In fact in such circumstances the prudent course 
of action to take would be to place the company under business rescue proceedings. 
3.7.5 Business Rescue 
These are proceedings meant to rehabilitate a company that is financially 
distressed.143 Instead of gambling with the assets of a company which is 
experiencing financial difficulties and risk incurring liability for breach of section 22 
which prohibits insolvent trading, the board of directors should instead place the 
company under voluntary business rescue proceedings in terms of section 129(1). 
 These provisions provide a substantial measure of protection for creditors by 
essentially preventing the board of directors from assuming greater risk when 
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creditors are faced with the greatest peril. This is buttressed by the fact that 
creditors‟ fall within the definition of affected persons144 and are entitled to apply to 
the courts for an order placing a company under supervision and commencing 
business rescue proceedings.145 Once business rescue proceedings commence 
creditors are entitled notice of each court proceeding, decision or meeting or other 
relevant event and to vote on a proposed rescue plan.146 
3.8 Conclusion and Recommendations  
The specific creditor protection measures adopted in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
are robust and are equal to the task of providing protection to creditors. However, 
creditor protection in South Africa would be more comprehensive if it is contained in 
a fiduciary duty operating in favour of creditors instead of being wholly dependent 
upon specific statutory provisions. 
Though there is, to date, no South African ruling that recognises any duty on the part 
of directors to protect creditor interests when a company is experiencing financial 
difficulties, the South African courts have, with the enactment of a new company law 
statute, been afforded with a golden opportunity to review what constitutes „the best 
interests of the company‟.   
It remains to be seen whether they will adhere to the myopic conception of the 
company taken in the Greenhalgh v Adernne Cinemas Ltd ruling or whether they will 
take a more expansive approach.  
A compelling case can be made for the South African courts to take that direction. 
The corporate governance environment in South Africa has undergone some 
transformations as a result of the enactment of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and 
the presence of the King reports.  
In the light of these restrictions, it is untenable to hold that the words „in the best 
interests of the company‟ as they are used in section 76(3) of the Act still carry the 
same common law connotations as exemplified by the Greenhalgh v Adernne 
Cinemas case.  
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It is submitted that the prohibition against insolvent and fraudulent trading and  
restrictions on distributions modifies the traditional conception of the company and 
compels an active consideration of creditor interests, at least when a company if on 
the brink of insolvency, before authorising any distribution and deters fraudulent or 
reckless trading.  
If a company is facing financial difficulties then the prudent course for the directors to 
take would be to voluntarily place the company under business rescue proceedings 
in terms of section 129(1) which provides that the board of directors may resolve to 
place the company under business rescue proceedings if it believes that the 
company is financially distressed and that there appears to be reasonable prospects 
of rescuing it. This reinforces the approach that the directors of a company owe a 
duty to the company itself as a separate entity and to keep it as a going concern.  
The cumulative effect of the restrictions against distributions that impoverish the 
company and prohibitions against insolvent trading is that it creates a duty on part of 
directors in favour of creditors. It might not be created in the same mould as fiduciary 
duties or expressly mentioned in section 76 and creditors might not be able to bring 
an action based on the breach of a fiduciary duty or mount a derivative action but 
section 218 (2) achieves the same results for all intents and purposes as an action 
grounded on the breach of a fiduciary duty. 
 It is submitted that the scope of the protection cumulatively provided to creditors by 
section 22 as read with section 218 (2) would be amplified if the South African courts 
recognise that what constitutes the best interests of the company comprises a 
„community of interests‟ 147 and that the board of directors have to take into account 
the legitimate interests of the other corporate constituencies. 148 In the event of 
financial difficulties from which the company, objectively viewed, is unlikely to 
recover from, what may constitute best the interests of the company may be to treat 
creditors‟ interests as paramount. The fact that courts in the comparable jurisdictions 
of Australia and the United Kingdom have recognised the existence of such a duty 
holds a substantial measure of  persuasive authority that South African courts should 
consider.  
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Further, considering that one of the stated objectives of passing the new Companies 
Act is the promotion of efficiency and the efficient distribution of resources which is 
reflected in section 7 (b) (i) which provides that the purpose of the Act is, inter alia, 
encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency; there are cogent arguments 
in favour of the existence of the duty to creditors. It is submitted that a duty on the 
part of directors will promote the efficient distribution of resources.  
This fiduciary duty would serve as a necessary counterbalance to the protection 
afforded to shareholders by limited liability, a sort of price for limited liability.149 It 
would reduce the need for creditors to insist on lengthy and complex contracts with 
onerous terms and the need to engage in protracted negotiations.150 This, it is 
submitted, would have the effect of reducing the cost of borrowing as the time and 
costs involved in protracted negotiations and the drafting of contracts will be 
reduced. This can have a positive overall effect on the economy and development of 
entrepreneurship as it would help to lower the cost of obtaining capital. 
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Chapter 4 
4.1  Employees’ Contribution to Corporate Resources   
At the dawn of the industrial age corporate activities relied primarily on scarce 
physical assets such as land, plants and buildings and financial capital and as a 
result modern company law crystalized in an era where the primary measure of 
enterprise wealth was based on tangible assets.151 Employees had virtually no role 
in the dominant narrative of company law and it developed centred on the 
relationship between the shareholders, directors and managers of a company.152 
However, there is an on-going shift of paradigm in the nature of most economies in 
the world that is seeing the decline of the industrial and manufacturing sector and the 
ascendancy of technology and service companies that rely on knowledge as their 
primary source of competitive advantage.153  
This phenomenon is being described as the „new economy or knowledge based 
economy.154 The new economy is based on growing the value of knowledge as an 
input and output making it the most valuable ingredient of modern commerce.155 
These radical changes to economic production ushered in by technology revolutions 
driven by technology, software and telecommunications companies have forced 
business people and academics alike to examine exactly how wealth is generated in 
modern enterprises.156  
The modern company now relies on the following sources of capital, physical (plant 
& equipment), financial (equity, debt and retained earnings) and intellectual capital 
(intangible resources such as human capital, relational capital, brand loyalty, 
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intellectual property) with the latter growing in importance.157 Human capital has 
been described as the „the new oil‟ 158 
South Africa is experiencing these changes and the nature of the South African 
economy is changing from being dominated by mining companies and a new 
economy is emerging which is centred on telecommunications, technology, media 
and financial services companies. 159 Presently four of these „new economy‟ 
companies, namely Standard Bank group, MTN, Vodacom and First Rand are in the 
top fifteen of the largest companies in South Africa measured by market 
capitalization.160 
This rise of knowledge driven technology and financial services companies around 
the world is compelling a re-examination of the status of employees which is 
transforming from previously being treated as an expense by traditional accounting 
practices to being the primary driver of wealth creation of the emerging new 
economy. 161 
However company law and its narrow definition of the duties of directors does not 
reflect the growing realisation in the world of commerce that intellectual capital is fast 
becoming the most important input in modern corporate activities making employees, 
as the generators of intellectual capital, an indispensable corporate constituency 
making contributions that rival that of the providers of finance that is the 
shareholders and creditors.  
 Employees have traditionally played no role in the governance of public companies 
under the shareholder centred Anglo-American model. However, as noted by 
Professor Robert Baxt that despite the fact that the law has yet to legally recognise 
any duties owed by directors to employees, „things may be changing fast‟. 162 It has 
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been argued that the real revolution surrounding the modern „knowledge worker‟ is 
that people have, for the first time in history, control of what is increasingly becoming 
the most critical input in modern corporate production, that is their know-how or 
„brain-power‟.163 
As put by Charles Handy; 
“People now own the means of production in organisations that rely on intellectual 
capital, on knowledge and skills, because the people have them in their brains and 
can walk out of the organisation at any time … and that is going to change the nature 
of capitalism  … they have market value and can walk out”164 
Employees are also investors in the company and often have a long-term interest in 
the success of their company that at least equals and in many cases exceeds the 
interests of the shareholders165  and risk incurring substantial losses if the company 
fails.166 The foregoing is aptly captured in the words of Professor Clyde Summers in 
the following manner; 
“…employees …are as much members of the [company] as the shareholders who 
provide the capital. Indeed, the employees may have made a much greater 
investment in the enterprise by their years of service, may have less ability to 
withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the enterprise than many of 
the stockholders”167 
Contrary to the position of the residual risk bearers‟ theory which restricts the 
meaning of risk to fina cial risk 168 it is posited that employees are the most 
vulnerable of all the key corporate constituencies.169 Employees, for example, are at 
risk of the expropriation of their investments by both managers and shareholders in 
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the course of a fundamental transaction especially a takeover170 with resultant job 
cuts. 
 Employees derive their economic livelihood from and dedicate great proportions of 
their time to the companies that employ them.171  Shareholders can limit their 
exposure to a particular company or even a particular type of companies by a policy 
of portfolio diversification172 and have the added advantage of being easily able to 
exit the company. Employees on the other hand cannot readily exit the company 
unless there is a ready market for that particular employee(s) skill-set.173 
Employees are usually bound to contractual terms that ensure their services are 
rendered to a specific company only at a time, if there is no ready job-market for  
particular skills they are at a tremendous risk of a sudden and adverse change in 
their economic circumstances if they are suddenly retrenched‟. 
Companies wield „social decision-making powers‟174 in shaping the lives of 
employees and the democratic imperative that those substantially affected by 
decisions made by institutions, whether private or public must be involved in the 
decision-making process175 compels a re-examination of the corporate legal 
structures that govern the relationship between the company and its employees.  
It has even been posited by some scholars176 that co-determination involving an 
active involvement and the enfranchisement of the employee constituency would 
actually improve the efficiency of the company. Employees because of their intimate 
involvement with the company are in a far better position to overcome the problem of 
information asymmetry that has been a formidable challenge to scattered and 
passive shareholders. Employees are potentially more efficient monitors of 
managers than shareholders.177  
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Because employees have a daily commitment to the activities of the company can 
better organise a collective action programme whereas shareholders of a widely held 
public company, on the other hand, are usually passive and cannot easily organise 
themselves into concerted action.  
Advocating for greater employee participation in the corporate decision making 
process is by no means new and has been recognised at the highest level in 
continental Europe as far back as the 1970s as demonstrated by European policy 
documents such as the Draft Fifth Directive EC Green Paper on employee 
participation [Employee Participation and Company Structure, 1978]. 
 More recent expressions of Europe‟s political will to provide for employees rights to 
information and consultation in the governance process are the following policy 
documents; The Directive on European Works Council (1994), Worker Involvement 
in the SE (2001), and Standards of Information and Consultation of Workers (2002). 
Germany is the most notable example of a country that has developed a system of 
corporate democracy built on the foundation of the principles of codetermination and 
employee direct participation in the governance process.   
Three methods of protecting and advancing the interests of employees as a 
corporate constituency by legislative means seem to have emerged and legislative 
efforts to protect employee interests have followed one or more of the following 
trajectories; 
(i) Recognising a fiduciary duty owed by directors in favour of employees 
(ii) Or direct or partial-participation in the governance process by way of 
nominating and electing a section of the board of directors178 
(iii) Strengthening labour laws and passing specific legislation to protect 
employee interest in certain specific instances   
In order to gain a better understanding of whether and to what extent  the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 advance and protect the interests of employees as a 
stakeholder constituency, it is imperative to conduct a brief study of the legislative 
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developments surrounding this issue in comparable jurisdictions of the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
4.2 Constituency Statutes in the United States 
The market for corporate control in the United States was very active in the 1980s 
and there was a wave of hostile takeovers that swept the corporate landscape 
across the country and left a trail of massive job losses. 
 This radical manifestation of profit maximization for shareholders and the extensive 
damage it wrought on employees as a constituency and whole communities through 
plant-closures and relocation of wealth from some states to others led to the 
enactment of non-shareholder constituency statutes as part of state legislative drives 
to stem the tide of hostile takeovers. 179  
Characteristically constituency statutes permit or require directors to give 
consideration to the interest of enumerated groups in dispensing their fiduciary 
duties.180 However, most of the statutes are permissive as opposed to mandatory 
and merely permit but do not compel directors to consider non-shareholder interests 
and it is only  in the case of Connecticut which passed a  statute that compels 
directors to give consideration to the interests of other constituencies.   
However, the mere fact of permitting directors to consider non-shareholder interests 
was a radical departure from the traditional exclusive shareholder concern of 
American corporate law and carried with them enormous potential of effecting 
revolutionary changes to context of corporate decision making in the US.  
The American states that passed constituency statutes appear to have attempted to 
implement something like the first trajectory by attempting to create a fiduciary duty 
running in favour of non-shareholder, constituencies.181  
However, constituency statutes raise questions of whether or not they extend the 
ambit of fiduciary duties and if non-shareholder groupings such as employees have a 
right to enforce them? Unfortunately the constituency statutes do not provide the 
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answers to these questions, they are at best vague.182The ambit of their application 
was limited from the outset because the majority of them, even the mandatory 
provisions of the Connecticut statute, are explicitly restricted to transformative 
transactions and disposal of substantial assets.  
They failed to address the critical issues of what weight should the directors attach to 
shareholder and non-shareholder interests? The steps directors should take when 
those interests cannot be reconciled, or when the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies clash amongst themselves?183   
Consequently, constituency statutes in the United States have had a minuscule 
impact on the advice furnished to board of directors and in courtrooms across 
America. To date very few cases that have appeared before the American courts 
have even mentioned constituency statutes184 and there is yet to be a decisive 
decision from the American courts authoritatively ruling on the application of these 
constituency statutes. 
But at least they add value by providing a starting point for developing a more 
inclusive approach. It has been suggested by Professor Bainbridge that the fact that 
the statutes permit directors to consider the interest of non-shareholder 
constituencies compels an interpretation that allows directors to make trade-offs that 
might even cause a reduction in shareholders‟ gains for enhanced stakeholder 
welfare or otherwise the provisions would be completely lacking in substance and 
significance. 185 There would be absolutely no point in giving directors the right to 
consider non-shareholder interests but without the right to protect those interests.   
4.3 The United Kingdom  
Sections 172 of the UK‟s Companies Act of 2006 embody the enlightened 
shareholder value approach which was recommended by the Company Law Review 
Steering Committee.186  It permits directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of the 
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company's employees, the need to foster the company's business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others, and the impact of the company's operations on the 
community and the environment.  
Section 172 of the UK‟s Companies Act of 2006 is permissive as opposed to 
mandatory in a similar manner as the US constituency statutes. Despite the use of 
the phrase „enlightened shareholder value‟ which creates the impression that it is a 
concept substantially different from the shareholder primacy norm, the reality is that 
the changes are minuscule.187 
 The section makes it clear that shareholder interests remain paramount and only 
seeks to modify the context in which shareholder value is pursued.188 It does not 
authorise directors to balance the interests of the company‟s constituencies and 
make trade-offs between their respective interests and therefore they cannot pursue 
a course of action that might result in the reduction of shareholder value but 
increases the welfare of other constituencies.189 The directors remain only directly 
accountable to shareholders and it is only the shareholders that hold the right to 
elect directors, bring derivative actions and vote on transformative transactions.190 
Section 172 does not, in any significant way, reflect the indispensable contribution of 
the employees as a corporate constituency that is increasingly becoming paramount 
in the world of commerce. It does not extend fiduciary duties to protect employee 
interests because it denies employees and other non-shareholders constituencies an 
enforcement mechanism such as the right to bring a derivative action.   
Employees in the United Kingdom are still disenfranchised as the Companies Act of 
2006 does not give them the right to make any direct input in the governance 
process through voting for any section of the board of directors.  
 Section 172 permits directors to consider non-shareholder interests but denies them 
the power to protect these interests and stakeholders are denied the power to legally 
compel directors to protect their interests.  Section 172 is, as the American 
constituency statutes, likely to have minuscule impact on the manner in which 
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boards in the United Kingdom make their decisions due to the absence of effective 
sanctions to compel changes in corporate culture, the attempt at an inclusive form of 
corporate governance in terms section 172 is likely to prove ineffectual.191 
4.4 Codetermination in Germany  
The corporate governance systems of continental European countries have a more 
pronounced stakeholder inclination as compared with the Anglo-American model. At 
least with respect to employee involvement in the corporate governance process, 
continental European countries are much more inclusive in their corporate 
governance systems.  
They are firmly grounded in the notion of codetermination which provides for 
employee consultation and participation in the company decision making process 
and consequently  the interests of the employees are systematically considered in 
the decision making process.192 This basic principle is common to all the corporate 
governance systems in the eighteen EU countries193 despite their formal differences. 
Germany has the most famous and most highly developed systems of board-level 
codetermination. The system is characterised by a two-tier board system mandated 
by the Codetermination Act of 1976 and its subsequent amendments and comprises 
a managing board (Vorstand) and the supervisory board (Aufisichtsrat).  
Employee participation in the governance process takes place at two levels, the 
establishment level through the system of workers councils and at the board level 
through the right to elect representatives to the supervisory board. Employees in 
companies that are mandated to have the dual board system have a right to elect a 
certain percentage of the members of the supervisory board. Employees in a 
company with between 500 and 2000 employees can elect up to a third of the 
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supervisory board members and if the company has more than 2000 employees 
then they have a right to elect half of the members of the supervisory board. 194 
As a matter of positive law, the German model of corporate governance provides for 
strong protection of employees as a key corporate constituency by providing them a 
direct role in corporate governance.195 The pronounced role that employees play in 
the governance process under the German system of codetermination precludes the 
view of the company as merely a vehicle to maximize shareholder gains but 
considers other stakeholders, notably the employees as members of the company 
and accordingly management under German law is not obliged to maximize share 
prices.196 
There are important advantages to the employee constituency that can be observed 
in the experience of Germany and its system of codetermination.  German presents 
an example of progressive stakeholder legislation, at least with respect to 
employees.  
Instead of the third trajectory of protecting employees through specific legislation 
which seems to be favoured here in South Africa which is aimed at curbing 
excessively harmful or socially unacceptable corporate practices197 the German 
approach fosters positive engagement and dialogue between management and 
labour. Employee representation on the supervisory board forces direct negotiations 
of key employee concerns such as working conditions and remuneration.198 
The potential benefits of employee involvement as a monitoring device for 
management can be observed in Germany, at least with respect to levels of 
executive remuneration.  Directors in the United States, where the corporate 
landscape is characterised by passive dispersed shareholders are able to engage in 
self-serving practices such as excessive executive compensation which has been 
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described as the most egregious corporate governance failure of the 21st century.199 
The US has the highest levels of executive compensation in the world with the 
highest paid CEO in 2011 being paid US$ 84, 3 million200 which dwarfs that of the 
highest paid CEO in Germany who stands at €9. 3 million (US$ 13.5 million).201 
The relatively modest levels of executive compensation in Germany can, in part, be 
attributed to the presence of employee representatives on the supervisory board. If a 
portion of the supervisory board‟s composition comprises employee representatives, 
the character of the discussions of executive remuneration would be markedly 
different in its tone and results.202  
The pronounced employee participation in the governance process under the 
German model is an example of a progressive corporate governance system, at 
least, to the extent of curbing management self-aggrandizement at the expense of 
other constituencies.203 
The direct representation of employees on the supervisory board also appears to 
have a chilling effect on hostile takeovers.204 There have been relatively fewer hostile 
takeovers in Germany compared to the US and the UK. For instance during the 
period of 1988 to 2003 473 takeover bids were announced in the US, 273 in the UK 
and only 7 in Germany.205  
 Takeovers generally tend to generate a great deal of wealth for the shareholders but 
simultaneously tend to impose grave costs on other corporate constituencies notably 
employees.206 To the extent that employee direct representation at board level has a 
chilling effect on hostile takeovers, employees also serve as a proxy for the interest 
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of other stakeholder constituencies such as the community that may be spared a 
potentially disastrous plant closure.207 
4.5 Employees as Stakeholders in South Africa 
Employees in South Africa find themselves in a uniquely favourable position in that 
the South African constitution enshrines a number of employee rights as 
fundamental human rights such as the right to organise, the right to strike, the right 
to fair labour practices and the right to be represented by trade unions.208 Statutes 
like the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA) and the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA) and even non-employment legislation such 
as the Competition Act 98 of 1998 give effect to the constitutional guarantees of fair 
labour practices.  
Section 76(3) of the Companies Act 2008 which contains the statutory expression of 
the duties of directors does not explicitly permit or mandate directors to consider the 
interests of employees or any other stakeholder groupings when they are dispensing 
their fiduciary duties.  South Africa clearly favoured the third trajectory of specifically 
legislating for stakeholder protection in separate legislation outside the main 
company law statute and the DTI in its policy document stated that the „advancement 
of certain stakeholder interests‟ interest may be best effected through separate 
legislation‟209 
Accountability to non-shareholder constituencies can be achieved by a host of other 
methods and mechanisms for instance external statutes that directly regulate 
important issues such as workplace safety, health, job security during transformative 
transactions, affirmative action, collective bargaining and environmental 
protection.210  
However, regard must be had of the fact that this approach is by no means new and 
external legislation aimed at curbing corporate excess and protecting labour interests 
have been in place for decades in different jurisdictions but their impact has not been 
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substantial because they are designed to rectify specific manifestations of harmful 
practices rather than to expand the rights of key stakeholders in the governance 
process.211 
It is generally considered that South Africa due to its colonial history and ties to the 
UK has generally adhered to the shareholder-centred Anglo-American model. The 
new Companies Act and the King reports have introduced important modifications to 
the typical Anglo-American system of corporate governance so much that it can 
properly be described as a hybrid.212  
The Companies Act gives employees certain enforcement remedies that have 
traditionally not existed in company law legislation. Employees have the right to 
institute a derivative action against company directors,213 a right which is reserved 
only for shareholders in the UK and the US, a right to institute proceedings to have a 
director declared delinquent214 and the right to apply for the initiation of business 
rescue proceedings215 and also to be informed and consulted during business 
rescue proceedings and to vote on the business rescue plan to the extent that they 
can be considered to be creditors of the company. These rights give employees a 
considerably powerful voice in the governance process.  
The enforcement devices that have been extended to employees indicate an 
expansive conception of the company that goes beyond the basic shareholder-
centric view of the company as being merely a vehicle for maximizing shareholder 
value. They implicitly recognise not only that other stakeholders have a vested 
interest in the success of the company and require enforcement devices to protect 
those interests but also the monitoring function that employees can perform to reign 
in management self-serving practices216. 
The question that therefore follows is that: are the interests of employees as a key 
corporate constituency adequately protected under South Africa‟s emerging „hybrid‟ 
corporate governance system?  
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4.5.1 Employee Protection in Takeover Situations 
It has been long contended that the interests of shareholders are best protected by 
an unrestricted market for corporate control which is seen as an effective tool to 
discipline managers.217 Takeovers generally tend to produce a great deal of wealth 
for shareholders but raise the question whether this generation of wealth is a result 
of superior productivity and efficiency of a company or whether it comes substantially 
from imposing costs on other stakeholders notably the employees of the target 
company.218 
Experiences in the United States during the wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980s 
clearly reveal that employees as a stakeholder group are at their most vulnerable 
during transformative transactions such as a hostile takeover, a merger and 
acquisition and the sale of the company as a going concern and require special 
protection during transformative transactions as was attempted by the constituency 
statutes in the United States.   
The extent to which employees are protected under company law or extraneous 
legislation in the context of transformative transactions depends on the conception of 
the company in a particular jurisdiction.  In countries that adhere to the shareholder-
centric model transformative transactions are perceived to be consistent with 
economic efficiency and consequently the rules pertaining to transformative 
transactions especially takeovers are flexible and only shareholders have the right to 
approve such transformative transactions.219  
With respect to transformative transactions South Africa clearly adheres to the 
shareholder-centric model. One of the stated aims of the new Companies Act is to 
facilitate business combinations.220 The DTI clearly subscribes to the efficiency 
hypothesis and states that takeovers are a useful mechanism by which to replace 
inefficient management with a more competent management and therefore results in 
efficient allocation of resources.221 
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Chapter 5 has no provisions which deals with fundamental transactions that are 
meant to protect stakeholder interests.  The board is prohibited by section 126 to 
take any frustrating actions once an offer has been made or is imminent in order to 
allow the shareholders to decide on the merits of the offer. However, since the voting 
rights of shareholders are an incident of property, they are entitled to vote to 
advance their interests and frequently do so in takeover situations often to the 
detriment of other groups or in the face of opposition from other stakeholders.  
The recent takeover of Massmart by Wal-Mart is a case in point. The takeover was 
fiercely opposed not only by the biggest trade union COSATU together with 
Uniglobal Union but also by the government itself which feared that Wal-Mart would 
use its global standing to import merchandise at the expense of local supply chains 
and, considering the size of Massmart, this could negatively impact on local 
manufacturing concerns and consequently employment in these concerns.222 
However, the shareholders of Massmart still voted in favour of the takeover in spite 
of the concerns raised by the unions and the government about the potentially 
detrimental effects of the takeover. 
 Stakeholder protection in takeover situations comes from the Competition 
Commission which will consider the effect of a merger or takeover on the following 
areas;  A particular industrial sector or region, employment, the ability of small 
businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to 
become competitive,  and the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets.223  
At least in the case of the Wal-Mart takeover of Massmart the Competition Tribunal 
approved the takeover with conditions that seek to protect employment, at least at 
Massmart, such as the reinstatement of the 503 employees that had been laid off in 
anticipation of the takeover and a moratorium on lay-offs for the next two years. 
However, the German experience with co-determination indicates that employees 
are in a far better position to protect their own interests when they have 
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institutionalised legal mechanisms, such as the right to elect a percentage of the 
board members, at their disposal.224  
Section 197 of the LRA incorporate the principles enunciated in the EU Directive 
2001/23/ of 12 March 2001 which provides for employee protection in cases of 
business transfers. Despite the fact that s112 of the Companies Act which deals with 
disposals of assets or an undertaking doesn‟t enfranchise any non-shareholder 
constituencies, it is submitted that employee interests are adequately protected in 
the circumstances because of the operation of s197 of the LRA.  
The section provides that whenever a business or any part thereof is transferred as a 
going concern the new employer must take over all of the employees on the same 
conditions of service, the rights of the transferred employees apply to the new 
employer, everything done by the old employer such as unfair dismissal is 
transferred to the new employer and the transfer does not interrupt the continuity of 
service. 
4.5.2 Business Rescue 
The strongest expression of the recognition of employees as a key stakeholder 
group with a vested interest in the enterprise success in the new Companies Act is 
contained in chapter 6 which deals with business rescue. The far-reaching right 
granted to employees under this chapter recognise the detriment that employees 
suffer when a company collapses. These  range from unpaid entitlements to job 
losses.   
Employees and trade unions are given the right to apply for commencement of 
business rescue at any time even after liquidation proceedings have been 
commenced225 and to the extent that any monies relating to employment is still 
outstanding at the time of the initiation of business rescue proceedings or that 
become due and payable during the course of the proceedings,226   the amounts are 
considered to be post commencement finance and the respective employees are to 
be treated as preferred unsecured creditors with „super preference‟  ranking that is 
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second only to the remuneration of the business rescue practitioner. 227 Further 
these preferences remain even if the company goes into liquidation.  
The business rescue practitioner is given extensive powers to alter, suspend or 
cancel contractual agreements by s136 (2) but the employment contract is immune 
to these powers and is protected by s136 (1) which provides that employees will 
continue to be employed under the same terms and conditions that were applicable 
before commencement of business rescue proceedings and these provisions cannot 
be contracted out of. It is also very significant that chapter 6 is the only part of the 
Act which enfranchises employees to vote on key matters. 
Section 144(3) enumerates extensive rights of the employees during business 
rescue proceedings that include the right to receive notice of every court 
proceedings, decision, meeting or any other relevant event concerning the business 
rescue proceedings and the right to vote on the motion to approve the business 
rescue plan to the extent that they are directors.228  
4.5.3 Social and Ethics Committee 
Employees and other stakeholders have been given an avenue through which their 
interests can be raised for consideration in the decision making process of the board 
of directors  by the provisions of section 72(4) to (10) of the Act and regulation 43 of 
the Companies Regulations 2011. These create a social and ethics committee in 
every state owned company and listed public company and any other company that 
scores more than five hundred points in terms of regulation 26(2). The Social and 
Ethics Committee is a legislative device designed to advance, at the board level, the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies by bringing these to the attention of 
board for consideration. 
A social and ethics committee established in terms of the afore mentioned sections 
of the Act has a far reaching mandate to monitor the activities of the company having 
consideration to relevant legislation, other legal requirements or prevailing codes of 
best practice. These are the ten principles set out in the United Nations Global 
Compact Principles; the company‟s standing in terms of the International Labour 
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Organisation on decent work and working conditions, the company‟s employment 
relationships, and its contribution toward the educational development of its 
employees. The Social and Ethics Committee is empowered by section 43 (b) of the 
regulations to draw matters within its mandate to the attention of the board of 
directors as and when circumstances require it. 
The provision, by legislative means, for a mandatory social and ethics committee on 
the boards of all listed public companies and state owned companies is an attempt to 
entrench the enlightened shareholder approach. Social and ethics committees have 
the right to bring issues within their mandate, such as employee interests as 
canvassed in the International Labour Protocols and codes of recommended 
practices such as the King Reports to the attention of the board of directors. 
 The presence of a mandatory social and ethics committee with a statutorily defined 
mandate qualifies the traditional meaning attached to the word „the company‟ which 
cannot, in the presence of such a requirement, continue to be viewed  of as a the 
sum total of the shareholders of the company as was held in the case of Greenlaugh 
v Adernne Cinemas Ltd.229  The effect of section 43(b) of the regulations is that the 
board of directors can legitimately consider the interests of other stakeholder 
groupings such as employees.  
However, the main shortcomings of the creation of a social and ethic committee for 
public and state owned companies are, firstly, the social and ethics committee is 
empowered to bring to the attention of the board matters within its mandate but the 
regulations do not oblige the board of directors to take these matters into 
consideration in its decision making process or to act on the recommendations of the 
social and ethics committee. 
 Secondly, the members of the social and ethics committee owe no direct legal duty 
to the stakeholders whose interests the committee is supposed to advance and 
protect230 and consequently the provisions of section 43 of the Regulations are 
unenforceable by stakeholders and their interests remain subordinate to the 
shareholder value maximization mandate.  
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The social and ethics committee is empowered to report to the shareholders of the 
company on matters within its mandate at an annual general meeting. The practical 
efficacy of this provision is doubtful as shareholders are legally entitled to vote in the 
advancement of their own selfish interests and the advancement of the interest of 
other constituencies might frequently mean diminishing the returns of the 
shareholders and consequently shareholders, for the most part would be reluctant to 
vote in favour of stakeholder advancement initiatives that are inconsistent with 
increased shareholder value. 
4.6 Conclusion   
The credentials of the Companies Act with respect to recognition of employees as an 
indispensible constituency, of the Companies Act are weakened by the failure of s76 
(3) to clearly state that a company is more than the equivalent of the general body of 
shareholders and that directors can legitimately consider the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies and still be acting in the best interests of the company.  
The primary criticism of the constituency statutes passed by some American states 
and s172 of the UK Companies Act of 2006, which explicitly permit consideration of 
non-shareholder constituencies‟ interests, is that they are vague and fail to address 
key issues like the weight to be attached to non-shareholder constituencies and 
whether directors are allowed to make trade-offs between the conflicting interests of 
the corporate constituencies?  
Therefore, it would be the more difficult to interpret section 76 (3) of the Companies 
Act as permitting the board of directors to take into consideration the interests of 
stakeholders such as employees in their decision making processes let alone 
permitting directors to make trade-off between the sometime conflicting interests of 
shareholders and other stakeholders and between the stakeholder groups 
themselves. 
However, the requirement for public listed and state owned companies to have a 
social and ethics committee allows, albeit by indirect means, directors to consider 
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies and the meaning that the courts will 
attach to the word „company‟ as it is used in section 76 (3) will have to be viewed 
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through the prism of the requirement of social and ethics committees for all public 
and state owned companies.  
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Chapter 5 
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations  
The DTI‟s in its policy document231 appears to embrace the inclusive governance 
approach. The policy document provides that “...the interests of shareholders should 
be balanced with those of other stakeholders   when this is appropriate and or 
required by the constitution and related legislation”232 and even goes as far as 
describing employees and creditors with shareholders as comprising the investors of 
a company.233 The King Reports from the very outset especially King III embraced 
an inclusive approach. King III states that directors must act in the best interest of 
the company but have to consider the interests of various stakeholders.234 
The wording of section 76(3) (b) does not appear to capture this inclusive approach 
or any other interpretation other than shareholder value maximization mandate in its 
traditional sense. Section 76 (3) (b) does not explicitly permit, let alone oblige, 
directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders in the decision making 
process. 
 Professor Farouk Cassim argues that the clear implication of the wording of section 
76(3) (b) and the conspicuous absence of mention of other stakeholder groups is 
that the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, have received no official 
recognition under the Act  with the exception of the social and ethics committee.235 
He further argues that the courts will continue to accord the word „company‟ the 
same common law meaning it has previously been accorded.236  
Traditionally the use of the phrase „best interests of the company’ has been 
interpreted to mean the best interests of the shareholders as a general body.237 It 
has been argued that equating the interests of shareholders as a body and the 
company‟s best interests is the only logical interpretation of the word „company‟ as it 
is irrational and contrary to reason to work in the best interests of an artificial entity 
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as an end it itself.238 Accordingly company law requires a residual beneficiary and 
shareholders have been traditionally viewed as the sole residual beneficiaries of 
corporate activity239.  
There are numerous court decisions where the phrase „best interests of the 
company’ has been interpreted as meaning the best interest of the shareholders as a 
body. In the case of Greenhalgh v Adernne Cinemas Ltd 240 the court held that; 
“…a company as a whole does not mean the commercial entity as distinct from 
shareholders. It means the shareholders or incorporators as a general body.”241 
Probably the most famous and oft quoted judicial exposition of this position was in 
the case of Dodge v Ford Motor Corporation 242 where the court said; 
“…a business corporation is organised and carried on primarily for the benefit of 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that 
end…”243  
The inescapable conclusion is that under the common law directors are obliged to 
discharge their fiduciary duties exclusively in favour of the whole body of 
shareholders.244 
However, there has been a shift of paradigm towards the recognition of a variety of 
interests. The new dispensation in South Africa characterised by a new constitution 
and other legislation such as the Labour Relations245 and the Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act 246  compel a different interpretation of what constitutes 
the modern company in the South African context. 
 It is untenable to continue to hold that a company sorely exists for the benefit of one 
constituency. The extent to which creditor and employee interests are protected 
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under the Companies Act 2008 will to a great extent depend on the meaning the 
courts will accord to the phrase “best interests of the company”, whether the words 
will be accorded an inclusive interpretation.  
The reform of company law in South Africa has to be viewed in the context of trying 
to develop a hybrid corporate governance model that retains its English origins but 
with a distinct African character that is embodied in the spirit of ubuntu.  The DTI 
expressed the policy aims of the company law reform process in the following 
manner; 
“On this approach, company law review in this country would not only follow the 
world trends but will take into account the country’s particular circumstances and the 
legislative environment” and the King Reports are even more explicit, King II 
provides that governance in any context reflects the value system of the society in 
which it operates and the African worldview and culture in the context of governance 
of companies in South Africa should be taken into account in the governance 
process.247 It goes on to enumerate some of the defining attributes of African culture 
which include spiritual Collectiveness which is prized over individualism and 
determines the communal nature of life and an inclination towards consensus 
building.248 
It is within this context that directors‟ duties as they are codified in the Companies 
Act should be interpreted by the courts.  An exclusive focus on shareholder value 
enunciated in such cases as Greenhalgh v Adernne Cinemas Ltd and Dodge v Ford 
Motor Corporation would be inconsistent with the African values espoused in the 
King Reports.249 
 Further section 5(1) of the Companies obliges the courts to interpret the Act in such 
a manner as to give effect to the provisions of section 7 which inter alia includes the 
promotion of compliance of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution in the application of 
company law and the reaffirmation of the concept of the company as a means of 
achieving economic and social benefits.250 
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It is submitted that provisions such as section 165 that grant non-shareholder 
constituencies such as employees the power to have a director declared delinquent 
and to institute a derivative action or section 22 that prohibits insolvent trading or 
section 128 that gives employees and creditors the right to apply for the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings implicitly recognises the fact that 
they have an interest in the manner in which the company is being managed and to 
some extent have reconstituted directors duties and beg the question whether 
directors owe them fiduciary duties?251  
This is buttressed by the requirement of a social and ethics committee which is 
mandated to monitor the activities of the company and in dispensing this duty, the 
social and ethics committee will be guided by relevant regulation, other legal 
requirements, prevailing codes of best practice in the field of social and economic 
development, good corporate citizenship, consumer relations and labour and 
employment  and to bring to the attention of the board of directors matters that fall 
within their mandate.252 
These duties might not be framed in the same manner as fiduciary duties in the 
sense that directors are not directly accountable to creditors and employees but 
these provisions certainly make them indirectly accountable to these non-
shareholder constituencies. 
 Consequently, any interpretation of the ambit of directors‟ duties under section 76 
(3), despite the conspicuous absence of mention of non-shareholder constituencies, 
must by necessary implication allow directors to consider the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies, especially employees and creditors in their decision 
making processes. 
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